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29 MAR 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: The CORONA Program**

1. The attached document is for your information. It reviews briefly the Agency's position in the CORONA Program since the formation of the National Reconnaissance Office. It further demonstrates that the Agency has a proper and valid role to play in CORONA although such a claim is not shared or endorsed by the Air Force.

2. From its content one may conclude that the NRO has sponsored or collaborated in many attempts to nullify or subjugate CIA's position in CORONA. We have cited several examples which establish our position and illustrate our case.

3. We have strived to present the facts objectively and with emotional calm. We hope that you will find this document helpful.

[Redacted]  
**JACKSON D. MAKEY**  
Chief, Special Projects Staff  
Directorate of  
Science and Technology

Attachment


APPROVED:

29 MAR 1965

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**Acting Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology**

Date



NRO review(s)  
completed.

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ATTACHMENT TO:

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CORONA

Dr. McMillan's willful cancellation of the CORONA Mission 1018 launch on 23 March 1965 culminates a series of actions dating back to the early days of the NRO to force the Agency either out of the satellite reconnaissance business or submit its activities to the desires and control of the Air Force.

The first NRO Agreement was signed on 6 September 1961. With Air Force personnel directing and controlling the NRO activities, the mechanism of that organization has proven a most useful instrument for the Air Force to implement its desires. As far back as 22 November 1961, the Air Force decreed its intention to eliminate CIA from the satellite reconnaissance program, when the then Col. John Martin, Chief of the NRO Staff, proposed to CIA the NRO functions and responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance. In that document, he proposed that the technical management responsibility for all projects, black and white, should be vested in the Air Force. He submitted that the Air Force should generate appropriate directives to transfer the total technical responsibility for ARGON, MURAL (CORONA) and Navy programs to the Air Force. Since there were only

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Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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two more launches scheduled in CORONA, and one unassigned payload, Col. Martin conceded that no change should be made in the present technical management structure of that program. He later went on to reaffirm that the CORONA program should remain the complete responsibility of CIA, since there were only two more shots. This acknowledgment by Col. Martin, although revealing the Air Force's intention to take over all satellite programs, clearly established the fact that CORONA was then the responsibility of CIA. By way of explanation, MURAL was the cryptonym given to the employment of two cameras to obtain stereo coverage as opposed to the single camera initially used in CORONA. Since then, the stereo program has dropped the term MURAL and continued with the original name of CORONA.

There are other documents in that period of time which also give testimony to the fact that CIA had a clear responsibility for CORONA payload. In the paper prepared by Mr. Gene Kiefer of CIA on 29 November 1961, referring to the CORONA program, he stated that primary cognizance for management and technical direction of the hardware aspects will remain within CIA for photographic payloads and nose cones. He further observed that CIA would continue with primary cognizance for operational planning and control of the payload operation and target

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coverage. CIA's primacy in the CORONA payload was noted again by Mr. Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, in a 7 December 1961 letter to Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In that letter Mr. Bissell acknowledged that the present allocation of responsibilities with respect to CORONA/MURAL/ARGON were as follows:

A. The Air Force had primary responsibility for:

- (1) launch scheduling and launching,
- (2) orbit and recovery operations,
- (3) development and procurement of boosters, orbiting vehicles,

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B. The CIA, on the other hand, had primary responsibility for:

- (1) targeting,
- (2) operational planning and control of payload operations,
- (3) development and procurement of photographic payload and nose cones, and
- (4) security.

In spite of CIA's clearly defined history for the responsibility of CORONA payloads there have been repeated efforts by the Air Force to divest the Agency of this role.

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Back in July 1962 Dr. Joseph Charyk, the then Director of the NRO, advised the various program directors of the organization and functions of the NRO. In that paper he commissioned the Director of Program A (Air Force) as being responsible for the National Reconnaissance Program's satellite effort, while the Director of Program B (CIA) was "responsible for the national reconnaissance programs conducted by the NRO through utilization of CIA resources."

In spite of the momentum which was given to the Air Force to usurp and control the satellite efforts, the Agency tenaciously held on to its CORONA position through the control which it had over the payload contracts and its management of the [REDACTED] By the end of 1963 the outright discord between the Air Force and the Agency in the CORONA program prompted many to seek various solutions. Dr. McMillan, who had replaced Dr. Charyk as Director of the NRO, offered his solution which would place the entire CORONA program including the CIA assets under the Air Force (General Greer). The Agency not only found itself a victim of a frontal assault to dispose it of its satellite interests, but also more subtle methods, which prompted the DCI, on 13 December 1963, to advise Dr. McMillan that he considered it essential that no action be taken within the NRO or its contracts structure at that time and that the status quo be maintained until he could consider the matter further.

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He emphasized that the resources of both CIA and the Air Force in fields related to aerial photography, both aircraft and satellites, must be preserved. He noted, however, that he had been informed by several sources that major contractors no longer felt free to meet with CIA officials and discuss problems, which through the years had been matters of mutual interest, without first securing Air Force permission. The Director went on to state that that statement extends both to problems related to existing programs and to discussions of new concepts. He cautioned that any such limitation, whether the result of a directive from a procurement officer or a subtle hint would, in his opinion, violate the basic tenet of the NRO Agreement, which provides for the full utilization of the resources of both the Air Force and CIA.

Up to this period of time in the CORONA program, the Agency interacted with a small group of officers in

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[redacted] On several occasions, Dr. McMillan had proposed that this office be subordinated to General Greer and that General Greer head up the CORONA program. Dr. Wheelon reported to the DCI and DDCI on 13 March 1964 that although two requests from Dr. McMillan had been disapproved by the DCI regarding the transfer of

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[redacted] cables from the West Coast indicated that [redacted] office was to be dissolved, its people transferred, and its function recreated under General Greer

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as the [ ] Office directed by Colonel Heran. Dr. McMillan later admitted the transfer in an 18 May 1964 memorandum.

By April 1964, the responsibilities within CORONA had become so confused by Air Force unilateral action that the Agency's Director of Program B cabled the D/NRO stating that "Recent events and communications force me to request formal clarification and definition of my responsibilities and functions concerning the [ ] and CORONA payload management." Undaunted, the Air Force continued to act as it wished even to direct CIA contractors. By the end of 1964 Dr. McMillan chose to ignore openly any role for CIA in satellite programs. In his year-end report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Board he stated that the Director, Program A, concentrates on satellite photography and SIGINT reconnaissance, while the Director, Program B, furnishes some procurement and security services to General Greer. At that point in time, the Agency was not only involved in CORONA, but had satellite developmental studies underway in [ ] using NRO funds.

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The year 1964 also witnessed the D/NRO's pressure to insert [ ] into the CORONA operational program. This effort reached somewhat of a climax in November when

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the CIA resident manager at the [ ] reported that [ ] personnel were engaged in seeking information regarding the payload, including operational information. The Agency's reluctance to permit [ ] representatives to acquire operational information resulted in a directive from the D/NRO that CIA issue instructions to the [ ] to release the requested information to the [ ] personnel. CIA responded by authorizing the [ ] to provide the payload information requested to [ ] in their capacity as general systems engineers. In spite of this compliance, the D/NRO issued cabled instructions under [ ] to both the Air Force and CIA, outlining new communications procedures and mission responsibilities effective 1 December. In effect, this cable deleted the [ ] from the CORONA communications network and transferred all of its responsibilities to the Space Tracking Center (STC) under command of General Greer. Additionally, it granted the STC not only the technical assessment and analysis of the payload, but also all on-orbit camera and targeting information. This action was immediately appealed by General Carter to Secretary Vance and Dr. McMillan and an agreement reached with Secretary Vance that no changes would be made to the procedures effective on 30 November 1964 until such time as a solution of the CORONA program

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organization could be achieved. Parenthetically, it should be noted that actual implementation of [ ] would have crippled the CORONA program since the CIA

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[ ] plays such a vital role in it. Even General Martin realized this fact and countered [ ] with the suggestion to the NRO that the [ ] be retained within the communications network, though under Program A. The NRO recognized that it had to respond to the decision of the DCI, DDCI, and Secretary Vance and cabled instructions some ten days later reinstituting communications procedures which were in effect prior to the infamous

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[ ] The D/NRO then took measures which to some extent circumvented the reversal of [ ] by personally visiting the STC. With his presence, he registered the demand for operational targeting information which heretofore had never been sent the STC. The Agency did not object, since it recognized that the D/NRO might personally desire that information and agreed with the exception to the communications procedures. When Dr. McMillan left the STC, he ordered the NRO to continue sending the information to the STC, thereby successfully accomplishing one of the major objectives of [ ] in spite of the Carter/Vance agreement to the contrary.

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The recitation of this determination by the NRO calls to mind other incidents which betray a relentless program by the NRO/Air Force to unseat and subordinate CIA in CORONA. Such actions by the Air Force have often placed the harmony and well-being of CORONA in jeopardy. To enumerate, during the Spring of 1964, prompted by a desire to meet the launch schedules established for CORONA, the then Captain Johnson of General Greer's staff directed the contractor to deviate from proven environmental tests on the CORONA cameras M-25, M-26 and M-27. The normal environmental testing of four days, at Capt. Johnson's directions, was reduced to one. When the CIA technical representative at the [ ] learned of this deviation, he raised strong objection, supported by the Systems Engineering Group, he asked for the complete results of the testing accomplished. Upon examination of the test data, he pointed out that the deviation invalidated the test of those instruments for susceptibility to corona discharge markings. Unfortunately, System M-25 was already at Vandenberg and had been accepted by CIA before the information of the shortened test was discovered. To meet the launch date, it was decided to allow the system to fly; however, the booster failed and hence orbit was not achieved. The CIA representative,

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however, refused to certify System M-26 for flight until a rerun of the environmental test was conducted. Capt. Johnson of General Greer's staff directed the contractor to ship Systems M-26 and M-27 to the Base without additional testing and General Greer's office accepted responsibility for their flight readiness. Capt. Johnson bought off on System M-26 for the Government and that system was flown as Mission 9062. The film returned from that mission was largely unuseable due to corona discharge marking. The CIA representative's recommendations were then accepted as valid; System M-27 was returned to environmental test and the results confirmed a bad roller which again, in all probability, would have caused corona discharge had that system flown. This particular incident highlights the need for CIA participation in the CORONA program to ensure that that program is conducted for its intelligence value and not necessarily for the sake of a launch schedule. The absence of intelligence philosophy was manifested again by Air Force personnel in Washington on 4 February 1965 when Col. Buzzard of the NRO Staff indicated that the CORONA launches would take place according to the established schedule, although

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[ ] of CIA contended that CORONA was an intelligence reconnaissance program and the missions

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would be flown in response to intelligence requirements, not precisely against launch schedules.

On Mission 1013 an unexplained anomaly caused the camera to make excessive unprogrammed cycles on its first revolution about the earth. The quality of the telemetry, however, was poor and the camera status could not be precisely established until after Rev 2. It was learned that although the camera system had started prematurely on Rev 1, it had turned off normally when the "off" signal was received from the stored camera program in the vehicle. The next revolution on which the vehicle would be acquired by a tracking station was Rev 6. During the ensuing five hours, the CIA representative meticulously studied all available data. From this data and his intimate knowledge of his payload, he concluded that the camera was operating normally and that if the targeting requirements demanded it, he would activate the system on Rev 6. He instructed the STC Field Test Force Director (FTFD) to send the appropriate command instructions to the tracking station; however, the Air Force FTFD, acting upon telephone instructions from General Greer's organization and on the advice of

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called the controller and directed that the payload be put in the "off" mode. Before the CIA representative could counter these instructions the vehicle faded over the horizon. Later evaluation of the telemetry confirmed

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that the CIA analysis had been correct and that the payload had been performing normally. In fact, it continued to perform normally throughout the mission. It is difficult to assess the resultant loss of intelligence information by this improper interference of Air Force and [ ] personnel.

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On this same mission there was an important intelligence requirement on Rev 14 which passed over Cuba. This pass was lost due to the fact that the Air Force had allowed a new and inexperienced man to be on duty alone in the STC during the active operation of the camera. Because this newly assigned officer obviously did not understand the workings of the system, he failed to send the requested command and, in fact, sent one that had not been authorized. The NRO immediately placed blame on the CIA representative and directed an investigation by General Martin and Colonel Heran into CIA communications practices. Although CIA was never officially advised as to the findings regarding this specific incident, we have subsequently learned from Col. Murphy of General Greer's staff that the error did not rest with CIA but with the Air Force.

It is interesting to note that although the Agency was being constantly assailed and pressured by the Air Force, it remained cooperative and responsive to

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program needs. On Mission 1014 it was learned that the orbital ephemeris developed by the Air Force proved unuseable for the mission. The orbit was to have been designed for maximum Cuban coverage, but due to the Air Force's contractor using a wrong orbital decay factor in their computation, the orbit developed had serious gaps in the primary areas of interest. By the time the error was discovered, it was too late to correct without slipping the flight. CIA proposed a new orbit, went to work with its computers, and on the same day produced the desired orbit, thereby achieving a minimum delay.

The progression of time proved an irritant to reasonableness on the part of the Air Force and this is best highlighted by the [ ] incident. In an unprecedented act, the D/NRO, exercising his authority as Under Secretary of the Air Force, directed the transfer of [ ]

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assigned to CIA and in behalf of the Agency headed our

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[ ] On 2 December 1964 [ ] received military orders directing that he report on 3 December for duty at the STC. Reassignment on such short notice is most extraordinary and the hypocrisy of the urgency was revealed when [ ] was assigned to the routine duty of investigating delinquent Air Force officers.

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This act by the D/NRO left our [ ] critically 25X1A  
undermanned, and this condition was aggravated by the  
requirements of an impending CORONA launch. General  
Carter appealed this action to Dr. McMillan without  
success.

Precipitous action by the Air Force caused yet  
another perturbation in January 1965. While under-  
going a routine test [ ] 25X1A  
(ablative shell) failed. Upon investigation the  
Air Force learned that the forebody's age since manu-  
facturing was 27 months. The contractor cited the  
fact that his manufacturing specifications only called  
for a shelf life of 12 months. Without further con-  
sideration or regard for programmatical impact, the  
Air Force directed that no forebodies which exceeded  
a calendar life of 12 months would qualify to be flown  
in the CORONA program. It should be noted that no  
forebodies had ever failed in flight, although many  
used in both CORONA [ ] had ranged as 25X1A  
much as 20 months old. CIA advised the Community  
immediately of the catastrophic effect which the Air  
Force direction would have on the CORONA program; in  
essence, standing that program down from operation for at  
least 3 to 4 months. The Agency undertook an investiga-  
tion to assess the facts at hand and to ascertain the  
actual limitations on forebodies calendar life. CIA

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noted that in a study approved by both Air Force and CIA contractor personnel the calendar life had been established at 36 months. CIA then commenced a test program to investigate the aging effects of forebodies. As a result of this test, forebodies calendar life has been established conservatively at 17 months. Again, uncoordinated and unilateral direction by the Air Force threatened a catastrophic impact on the CORONA program.

There are other examples which reveal that the Air Force's reluctance and failure to coordinate with CIA had programmatic impact. In September 1964 CIA registered its uneasiness at an Air Force proposal which would turn off the Stellar Index Camera pipeline in deference to a new Index camera which had yet to be developed. CIA's fears proved warranted and provision was made to continue procurement of the present system until the new one could be developed and tested.

In spite of such observations by the Agency, the D/NRO and the Air Force have continued to provide little in the way of information to CIA regarding requirements for CORONA flight units or spares. Recently it was discovered that the Air Force had issued production instructions to the AGENA contractor without a follow-up requirement being passed to CIA for the payload contractors.

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As a result Lockheed had produced AGENAs yet the necessary payload components had not been ordered.

These series of incidents have provided fertile ground for the latest and most dramatic NRO action. On 15 March 1965 Dr. McMillan proposed to General Carter that the Agency be directed to release all information on the condition and operation of the payload to the Director, Program A, or to any CORONA-cleared person as the Director, Program A may designate. General Carter did not concur in this proposal, but asserted that CIA is responsible for the operation and control of the CORONA payload and that he would not be a party to any directive which would dilute the effectiveness of the payload control, confuse the chain of command decisions, or permit unnecessary distribution of payload and operational information. Had the Agency not held its ground regarding this point, the major objectives of [ ] would have been achieved; namely, the targeting information already being supplied to STC by the NRO could be tied together with the payload telemetry readings and hence the Air Force would have the means at hand to duplicate the Agency payload command functions.

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To insure that there would be no further interference during the scheduled launch of Mission 1018 on 23 March the Agency sent a cable reaffirming the responsibilities

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of CIA vis-a-vis the payload, yet assuring the Air Force that information regarding the payload which could in any way affect the health of the vehicle or bear on the decision to de-orbit would be provided the Air Force. When Dr. McMillan received this word, he cancelled the scheduled launch of Mission 1018 on the grounds that CIA was not providing the Air Force with information essential for the conduct of the operation. He stated that since August 1964 CIA had been withholding payload data from the Air Force and that two incidents occurred during Mission 1017 which could have had serious effects on the health of the vehicle yet CIA continued to withhold the data. In subsequent discussions between the DCI, DDCI, Secretary Vance and Dr. McMillan, it was ascertained that Dr. McMillan's statements were inaccurate and incorrect. It was further demonstrated that the Agency had been supplying more information since August than at any time prior to that date. The two incidents which Dr. McMillan referred to caused no problem, CIA's decisions had been proper, and that in fact appropriate Air Force representatives had been fully informed of all details at all times. Dr. McMillan later admitted to General Carter that the Air Force did, in fact, have full details concerning the incidents.

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~~SECRET~~Summary

In looking back over the history of the CORONA Program, it becomes apparent that CIA does not claim any more for itself than that which it originally held and developed from the outset of the CORONA program. Specifically, this centers about the technical responsibility for the payload and the on-orbit control of the camera program. On the other hand, the Air Force and the NRO have worked incessantly in challenging CIA's foothold in satellite reconnaissance. The Agency has deferred from highlighting the failures and misdirections perpetrated by the Air Force, though history will testify that the failure of hardware under the Air Force's responsibility dramatically exceeds the minor mishaps in the camera operation. For the sake of the program, the Agency has attempted repeatedly to seek a mutual solution to CORONA management. Unfortunately, to date these efforts have been thwarted, rebuffed or ignored by the NRO/Air Force. During the latter part of 1964 and in early January 1965, members of the CIA staff in Washington conducted informal and without portfolio negotiations with General Stewart of the NRO Staff. It was hoped that these negotiations could lead to a CORONA agreement which would be acceptable to both parties. On 12 January 1965 General Carter tabled at the NRO Executive Committee meeting an agreement on

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CORONA management which was taken word for word from an agreement proposed by General Stewart. Dr. McMillan has yet to concur with this agreement, but in its place seeks piece-meal solutions which would strip the Agency of its present responsibilities.

It is submitted that the Agency has done everything to reach a satisfactory solution in CORONA yet preserve its original responsibilities. Air Force response, however, would suggest that unless the Agency agrees to total submission, an agreement is not desired.

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RMB recommends Approved F

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- 1) Concentrate responsibility in the hands of AF
- 2) Assign specified recon projs to AF, CIA, others.  
and either abolish NRO entirely or reduce it  
to an "extremely small office" w/ no procure. or  
ops. functions. — staff func for DCI & SecDef.
- 3) Expand NRO into self-cont. & completely unitary  
org. w/ DNRO w/ line resp over R&D, procuree  
& ops of recon sys. subj to superv. by SecDef & DCI

RWB recommends giving CORONA to AF.  
avoid gross duplication & coordination.

Sec Def McNamara on 9 Apr 64 told C. Clifford, Baker, & Loyn <sup>Coyne memo for File</sup> that NRP was not personalities [McCone & Gilpatric close friends] but <sup>trouble</sup> "an unreasonable, illogical split of NRP resps. between two agencies (Def & CIA).

25X1A RSM says "my U-2s" and "Your U-2s" absurd & "unbelievable mental attitude."

25X1C RSM would turn everything over to Def Dept. except

2 May 64 - 11-pg ~~re~~Memo for LBJ Subj N.R.P.  
w/its Recommends.

16 Aug 72 Memo for Rec. Comments by Ken Damm on PFIAB  
recons on NRO Helms lacks aggressiveness.

SecDef Laird *Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400120004-1*

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6 Sep 61 - R.S. McN. Memo Subj: (TS) Asst for Recon.

Refers to NRP-1 "Management of the NRP."  
appts AFUnd. Secy as his "Asst for Recon."

13 Oct 61 - PFIAB is briefed on NRP Coyne memo.

- 1) is NRO concept sound?
- 2) Would it be better under DoD?
- 3) better under one man than two? from sep. agencies
- 4) should Dir BoB be consulted on org & mgmt.?
- 5) Can the DDP devote adequate attn to <sup>all</sup> covert & overt Sat. & overflgt?

10 Oct 61 - Maxwell Taylor meets w/ RMB & Acaryk

17 Oct 61 - PFIAB discusses NRP & saw JFK

18 Jan 62 - PFIAB discusses NRO w/ Gilpatric; McCone; M.D. Taylor; Acaryk; Bissell.

26 Dec 62 - Coyne to Kilham about Acaryk's departure & replacement.

9 Mar 64 - <sup>Pres. IDA.</sup> RMB sends <sup>8-p.</sup> lengthy letter to DuRand on NRO  
Bissell resp to Chief, Air Staff & DCI

(1)

- 1) Concentration of Auth.
- 2) self-contained proj. org.
- 3) unified responsibility for all phases.

says NRO different in that it directs ~~rather~~ others to perform rather than perform itself.

says DNRO is "a personified apple of discord"

NRO has "two parents" who do not share equally in its guidance.

25 Jun 64 - Copy records conv. w/ DNRO in which M. William E. Vance  
says DCI suggested changes are contrary to PFIA B  
regs.

12 Aug 65 - 4<sup>th</sup> NRP making DNRO report to ExCom.

30 Sep 65 - Depart. DNRO MIM 13p memo to SecDef recommends  
SecDef continue to seek sole auth for manage NRP

Mar 72 - Dep SecDef Packard resigns

6 Sep 61 — 1<sup>st</sup> NRP

5 Dec 61 — Chavik/Bissell agree on div. of resp.  
"Co-directors"

25 Apr 62 — 2<sup>d</sup> NRP

2 May 62 — " " Revision

14 Jun 62 — Implement Directive

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26 Dec 62 — Coyne memo to Kilham says "two-man arrangement" involving DCI would continue.

13 Mar 63 — 3<sup>d</sup> NRP

13 Sep 63 — Gilpatric letter to PFIAB says NRO Satisfactory.

Jun 63 — PFIAB discusses NRO w/ DCI & DNRO.

6 Dec 63 — McNam tells Coyne Agency failures resulted from duality of respons.

Jan 64 — Ltr from Wm Duke, VP of ITT, to DNRO said probs were managerial not technical.

Mar 64 — Coyne & Doolittle to Lockheed & L.A.  
quotes Doolittle letter.

20 Mar 64 — DCI McCone ltr to Dr. Baker says wrong to consider NRO like org.

2 May 64 — Baker, Doolittle, Land recommend LBJ give ops control of NRO to DoD.

22 May 64 — <sup>McG. Bundy</sup> sends above recam. to DCI & Dep Sec Def Vance.

2 Jun 64 — Vance concurs w/ memo.

11 Jun 64 — DCI in 8-p ltr. says if done, he could discharge his resp. must be joint endeavor.

19 Jun 64 — DCI <sup>ltr</sup> tells Bundy he has met w/ Sec Def McNamara says Pres. Dir. not needed — can modify 13. ~~Mar~~ Mar 63




14 Apr 69 Memo for File Subj: Coyne

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never part of NRO — only camera is "black." 25X1

In Nov 68 Nite, Foster & Horning agreed to [redacted] [redacted] not supported by DCI Helms. Even rejected by Land Recon. Panel.

This was discussed by PFIAB w/ Nixon 18 Feb 69

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SNIE 23 May 68 Subj: Likelihood of [redacted] memo to Gen Taylor from Coyne suggest PFIAB consider the subj.

it concludes [redacted]

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23 May 69 — Baker draft suggests 1) Preservation of NRP Security and 2) Allocat. of resources are being jeopardized

[redacted] whose only surviving mission is [redacted] 25X1

PSAC's Land Panel raised "serious technical doubt" about it. Recommends no NPP or NRO funds for prog.

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Congress wants extensive briefing AF wants NRP funds.

26 May 69 Memo for Pres. Maxwell D. Taylor Chmn PFIAB

Says 22-23 May 69 meet of PFIAB discussed House Arm. Svc Comm; (40 membs) request for [redacted]

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Altho AF budget prog., its recon mission would involve NRO & Congressional int might compromise NRO [redacted] Urges Nixon to make "every

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10 Jun 69 - ~~MO. Taylor said~~

Dep Sec Def Packard memo to AFSec DNRO

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(2)

which will be part of NRP.

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1) to Save money

2) auto tech for unman. systems improved.

5 Sep 69 <sup>CIA</sup> Memo unsigned Subj: Photo. Sat. Coverage of Sov.

7 pp.

Strat. Offen. Targets - Oct 68 Sep 69

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from [redacted]  
for PFIAB's Adm. Anderson

22 Oct 69 <sup>unsigned</sup> Memo

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from [redacted]  
to ~~Gov~~ Coyne for Gov.  
Rockefeller on  
Sci. & Tech. Com. systems  
to cover USSR, PRC, DRV,  
DPRK.

1) Sat. Photo. Systems

2) Sat. SIGINT Systems.

3) [redacted]

4) [redacted]

5) Aircraft SIGINT Sys.

6) Aircraft Photo. Recon.

7) [redacted]

8) Other Progs Under Devel.

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SSMTC commo

ASW Radars

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J.P. Coyne

Plans for R-T Read-out  
from Sat. Recon. Vehicles.

(Photo)

Duckett invited to brief bd on CIA prog. Put on Agenda because PFIAB Chmn Baker concerned that CIA w/o knowledge or approval of NRO - may be in process of endeavoring to devel. [redacted] which may or may not be compatible w/ more adv. Sat. Recon Coll. vehicles."

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19 Nov 68 Inland memo. to Dr. Don F. Hornig. after PFIAB review of CIA & AF systems.

- 1 - Satellites can be built to stay aloft a year +
- 2 - Can send great quantities of info Sat to grd.
- 3 - [redacted] ready to take off.

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Needs priority attn & funding  
"No. current activity to invest. tech. relevant to this need" of process & display & record data on ground.

Wants concurrent funding of all technologies to allow system def. w/in year. - "if necessary @ expense of some current operating capability."

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19 Jan 66 ODCI Memo to PFAB Subj: Imagery Interp. Facilities Review  
to Gen. <sup>Maxwell</sup> Taylor, Chmn PFAB from AGen John M. Reynolds USAF A/D/DCI/NIFE  
Concerning Joint Imagery Interp. Review Grp.  
Study directed by Dir., BOB 9 Sep 65. to begin 9 Oct 65.

25X1

memo for USIB Subj: Security handling of Sat Recon Materials. 11 Jul 66 25X1  
from [ ] Jr. Exec Secy — Resub Session DD/NRO, Ch, COMOR, [ ]  
Reber.  
Mr. Denney from State said U. Alexis Johnson  
Asst Secy, NSM 156 Comm, saw "no serious political  
or security obstacles to going ahead w/ the  
imp. NASA prog. for peaceful use of sat photos.

17 Mar 67 — Sat. Spying Cited by Johnson NYT article.  
Surveillance alone justifies space costs.

JARG Report to PFAB 4 Jan 66

5 Sep 67 Memo for File Subj: Info Requested from CIA by Gen Taylor  
Coyle [ ] 25X1

25X1

On 31 Aug 67 Dirks was asked by ~~Taylor~~ <sup>Taylor</sup> about cost  
of [ ] — req. passed to DNRO Plax

9 Oct 67 Memo for Pat Coyle Subj: Applic. of Photo. Sats. to  
from A.H. Plax Crisis Situations  
6-pp. w/ 3 ?s & Ans.

1. Cost of Corona 25X1
2. Status of [ ] 25X1
3. Techniques to circumvent cloud cover [ ]

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A History of Satellite Reconm.


SAFSP

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25X1A

P. 9

in middle of effort.



JR Kilian & Schriever told  
told Bissell about WS-117L in June 57.


Kilian & Goodpastor shortly before Phas '57  
accepted Oden's modif. "Second Story"  
for open procurement.

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25X1A

~~By~~

RMB,



wrote

Cover Story.

Program ILA was overt name of WS-117L  
Return capsule proj.

10 MAR 58 CORONA named

Nov 58

Land told ARPA's Johnson

CORONA was consid. "an operating prog. to  
achieve a limited obj."

ITEK

"tremendous amt of strife" between AF/CIA  
 "Contractors do not know whom to go to  
 when they have probs."

————— 6 —————

Memo: Subj: Ideas for Discuss on NRO Probs for  
 the Baker Panel & the Clifford Board.

25X1A

McConne  
 undated

- 1) successful manned a/c flights
- 2) CORONA<sup>8</sup> successes. 4 failures

25X1A

Recommend both AF & CIA continue R&D.

- " single ops auth. for Sats.
- " NRO respons. allocated on prog. basis
- " Fund allocate on prog basis.
- " Conf. Funds & DCI's auth should be  
 recog & protect.

16 Mar 64

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Memo for the File  
Subj: Board Panel on NRO Activities — *Coyne & Doolittle & Baker to West Coast.*

CLJanson tells Coyne & Doolittle that DCI McCone gave the OXCART technology away before LBJ announced it.

CLJ says Ramjet tested on BONARC, but only for 1/2 hr @ maximum power.

25X1D

CLJ "hate to see the NRO prob that exists"

"both sides fight among themselves and as a result we don't get decisions" CLJ "longs for earlier days when he had someone, like RNB, to whom he could bring his probs & get rapid decisions."

CLJ says "CIA morale is "awful." doesn't talk to McCone because "DCI "is killing his minions."

CIA's CORONA Team "are dead on their fannies — and this goes for Lockheed."

Green complains CORONA prog is run by Committee

25X1A

[redacted] "black" auth to AF Secy under Pub Law 110

- Wants to integrate CIA Cont. Off into his staff
- Remove Conf. Cont. Bd.

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- [redacted] do systems engin.

LOCKHEED execs

Arrangements w/ AF sample w/ CIA complex

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b) NRO org. struc be improved as DNRO wants.  
c) Remove CORONA purch & ops from CIA, handle

(2)

d) All Sat recon to AF

e) New sat recon concepts develop by CIA  
up to operational pt & trans to ~~AF~~  
military or where DNRO wants.

f) manned oprnl recon by AF.

g) devel of new manned recon equip  
by CIA & trans to milit.

h) black Recon to military when surfaced  
otherwise remain in CIA

i) disband CCB

j) CIA & DoD monitors have no control  
over NRO, just report to principals.

k) If DDNRO authority cant be clarified,  
then eliminate.

8) Most import. NRO should remain <sup>relatively</sup> small

In March 64 only 4 CIA people @ Sunnyvale  
assoc. w/ CORONA.

24 Mar  
visit to  
Sunnyvale

Went to Vandenberg for CORONA-J launch

24 Mar 64 - failed due to power syst &  
crashed in Antarctic ocean.

①

25 Mar 64 Doolittle letter to Baker  
STL Inc  
letterhead.

- 1) NRO idea sound when conceived & imp leant.
- 2) "The org <sup>concept</sup> was largely wrapped around an individual & the basic org'l structure -- w/ divided auth -- was not sound & has again come back to haunt us."
- 3) The writ. agree signed by DCI & SecDef solved many probs "if all participants had adhered, w/ good will, to the spirit & letter of the docum."
- 4) The DCM does not interpret the doc. as intended and has not complied w/ it."
- 5) This lack of support makes ~~the~~ DNRO job "extremely diff & frustrating."
- 6) Had DNRO's reorg come off things might have been better. (from talks w/ contractors)
- 7) Recommendations:

a. Pres direct resolve impasse between DCI & SecDef. clarifying status, prerogs & expy proc'd of NRO.

19 Feb 64 Coyne memo for file Subj: NRO Panel.

McMullan sent Col. John Strand. to see Coyne  
who gave a list of docs needed for the  
25X1A NRO investigation. Arranged trip Coyne & Doohittle  
to. Burton  to LA Gen Greer Bill Baker  
Kelly Doohittle  
Coyne.

Hearings to begin 10 Mar 64 @ PFIAB.

Bill Baker decided against AF or CIA reps along  
for these hearings.

PFIAB Files.

Coyne & Baker meet McCone (a Langley on 2 Mar 64. 1 1/2 hrs.  
McCone said he understood that the matter had been taken up  
w/ LBJ. McCone also knew of PFIAB discussions w/ McMullen,  
SecDef McNamara, Dep SecDef Vance, & Clark Clifford.

McCone said this unfortunate & unnecessary for PFIAB to get involved

McCone says that Col. Strand's presence on PFIAB is a mistake.

McCone said observed that Pete Scoville had reached the point of 'being on the verge  
of a nervous breakdown over NRO'.

2 Mar 64 - Memo for the File Subj. Nat Recon Office 2pp Coyne  
Baker & Coyne met McMillan, Col. Strand at in.

25X1 McMillan says MOL is outside NRO. says AFSecy named Schriever to  
look after [ ] CofS Martin is now a Genl.

McMillan says AFSecy Brown doesn't like NRO spec. mgmt  
procedures, partic in R&D.

25X

McMillan says there is [ ] despite ADW's  
claims to contrary; says DepSecDef Gilpatric informed CIA  
this covert effort had not be assigned to CIA.

5X1A

Coyne says McMillan unclear about "on-orbit" control. Total for Green on  
[ ] but vague about CORONA. - "some obscure delegation or  
understanding" gave CIA some control.

25X1A

9 Mar 64 Memo for Panel, Subj: Board Panel on NRO Activ.s  
BAKER, DOOLITTLE, LAND, chaired by PFIAB Chairman Clark Clifford.  
Clifford said LBJ interested in Subj.

Doolittle & Coyne to Burbank [ ] on 5 Mar 64  
w/ Kelly J.

25X1

Doolittle & Coyne to see Genls Greer, Funk on sat. activities.  
also spoke to Lockheed Corp & LMSC pres. & key officials.  
& Pres of ITEK. Baker was present for LMSC & Itek discuss.

Gene Kiefer to speak to Panel on DDNRO & CIA  
AD Wheelon " " " " " " ~~CIA~~ for DCI  
& "internecine strife"

25X1A

DDCI [ ] on CIA

Gene Fubini on his monitoring of NRO.  
B. McMillan on NRO.

Subj. Excerpts from Minutes of NRO Panel Meeting of Mar 10, 64.  
Gen Martin, NRO CofS.

needs little change.

- (1) delete Fubini & Wheelon as "monitors"
- (2) CIA appt. resp. auth. prog. director w/ overall resp. for CIA's NRP, reporting to DNRO.
- (3) SecDef only policy guide to DNRO
- (4) CIA agree NRO is only "operating" agency under NRP
- (5) CIA reps in NRO to be divorced from CIA.

Kiefer, DDNRO

(1) Mods to NRO Agree no answer.

(2) Let NRO "fade out in 6 or 8 mos.

Make DNRO entirely separate answer only to Pres or SecDef. — not w/in AF.

(3)

(4)

(5) As CIA rep, "I am not fully accepted among senior AF personnel w/ whom I deal; & back @ CIA my principals work upon my assign. to NRO w/ considerable lack of enthusiasm." AF see it as "penetration;" CIA as "squeeze out."

(6) one reason for failure "CIA has tended to ~~not~~ give lip service to concept. ~~but for~~ DCI must decide to put CIA into full time, positive, participation in NRO.

Genl Carter —

DCI needs unimpaired & compelling control over all assets which produce intel.

(5) During my 2 yrs as DDCI I have tried to make the NRO work, & it has been the most frustrating experience of my 35 yrs of Govt Service.

Carter says NRO will not work as line org. — it should be a ~~line~~ management org. respons. to the JCS for tracking and monitoring the activities of CIA, NASA, AF, Army, Navy, et al —

## Wheelon

- ② ~~Bissell's failure was~~  
 "In R. Bissell CIA had a strong man w/ imagination & zip, whose failing was that he did not duplicate himself, & when he left CIA there resulted a vacuum which the AF was filled."

ADW admits "personality differences which have been a problem"

## Bross

Says <sup>NRO</sup> agree talks about "projects & programs" by CIA & DoD.

"One asset which CIA was in a position to bring to NRO was the DCI's auth. to certify conf. funds, which also implies the need for the DCI to have a personal relationship w/ contractors. — so there is a legal & practical reason why CIA wants to control relations — w/ NRO Contractors."

- (4) "The DCI has said that despite the wording of the NRO agree. (No 3) which reflects that NRO has operating responsibilities, the DCI has said he never intended to agree that NRO be a line org. Altho the DCI signed the agreem. containing such language, the draft was hastily drawn by myself & others in a 6-hr effort."

NSAM 156 reviewing current nat. space policy.  
15 Jan 62

10 Dec 63 - B. McMillan memo to Prog A & B on Corcoran gives full resp. to Dir, Prog A.

20 Dec 63 - McM. asks ADW to study mobile launched satellite

17 Jan 64 memo from IT&T's [redacted] on management @ Prog A & NRO. to McMillan.

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on 11 Mar 64 J.P. Coyne, in Note for File includes a list of questions prepared by NRO concerning Panel's meetings w/ Kelly J., Genl Greer, Genl Funk, & reps of Lockheed & Itek

in questions about CIA, the NRO paper points out that DDS&T has no role because OSA's Jack Ledford was Prog. B chief. only prog B was part of NRO - NOT DDS&T.

" ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED WHILE VISITING DDS&T. "

" (NOTE TO PAT COYNE: As you can see from the preamble to the Considerations under Prog B, DDS&T is not a part of the NRO. "

" c. DDS&T acts for the DCI to examine & monitor the NRP and, therefore, could not also be a formal part of the NRO w/ responsibilities to manage this development in a responsive manner to the NRO

22 Jan 58 —

29 Oct 58 — SENTRY requires. 20 ft or better.

on 10 Mar 60, AWD urges action to have SAMOS completed.

1 Sep 60 — DDE approves.

a. "A recoverable satellite-payload for high res.  
convergent stereo photos.

b. to be recovered <sup>for time being</sup> @ sea

c. " " " as soon as feasible on land.

d. to identify w/ certainty missile sites

Joint Recon Center (JRC) 9 Nov 60 memo from JCS  
w/ in Ops Direct, Joint Staff  
proposed.

19 Sep 61. Draft Recon. on CORONA  
Considered extra CORONA launches because of Berlin  
WALL  
at expense of ARGON — RMB's idea

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NRO

What is proj.

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Develop Oct 60 first flight Mar 62 flown 26 Apr 62



③ Fubini

"In Charyk/Scoville situation, Charyk had a slick way of not telling Scoville everything, because he felt if he didn't keep Scoville out of some things, the job would never get done because of Scoville's personality - & Scoville couldn't go along w/ Charyk's handling of him."

~~#M~~McMillan/Wheelon "Wheelon wants to monitor what MSM does as NRO Dir; W wants to run the show w/ more latitude than MSM wants to give him; & at the same time W wants to be on top of the CIA's scient & tech. effort in the recon field."

He wants SecDef control CORONA & Ewever to report thru Schriever to AdSecy.

Only aerial recon to CIA - all sats to DoD.

McMillan

When AWD became "monitor" McCone told MSM he should work w/ Loford on



- not AWD.

Say his CIA deputy (Kiefer) "is in fact an asst, not a true deputy."

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- ④ Land wants to Supercede NRO w/ new assignments of respons. by Pres. Directive.

CIA:

a) OXCART in toto

b) have USIB levy adequate requires  
(CIA has technical know-how to help)

c) assume ~~sp~~ responsibility for new adv.  
prog. develops & studies

1) analysis of scope of intell previously obtained

25X1D



AF:

a) CORONA/M

b) All Sat. Recon

General

a) Eliminate "monitors"

b) Est. new arrangem. which "succeeds"  
NRO.

c) prob. of ensuring ade Q. Requires  
guidance to Sat Recon  
to be handled separately.

27 Mar 64 Doolittle letter to Coyne about meet w/  
Baker in NY on 26 Mar.

The <sup>to a considerable extent a</sup>  
1) NRO is creature of PFIDB. This, whether we  
like it or not, increases our resp.

My personal conviction that DNRO should  
have far more auth than he has yet been  
able to exercise.

25X1 25 Aug 65 - LBJ press statement author.   
 GE,

25X1

\* U. Alexis Johnson chairs NSAM 156 Comm in Jul 66

Discussed NSCID on NRO from 5 Nov. 71 to 76


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Duckett & Colby 23 Jul 74 discuss also <sup>DNRA</sup>   
NRP & NURP w/ PFIAB.

1 May 74 — RMN directs PFIAB to conduct study  
of NRP.

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
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
## CHAPTER TWO

## SPACEFLIGHT OPERATIONS UNDERWAY

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 The Air Force general operational requirement for a strategic spaceborne reconnaissance system issued in 1955 called for an operational capability some ten years later, in 1965.<sup>1</sup> That date bespoke the low priority first accorded the satellite reconnaissance system by the National Security Council and clearly marked the satellite to follow and complement the U-2. But the Soviet space successes in 1957 helped accelerate all American space activity, including reconnaissance satellites. On 7 February 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the CORONA satellite project, predicated on recovering film capsules from orbit, with an initial operational capability in 1960. The overriding purpose of these efforts at overhead reconnaissance, whether electronic or visual, remained that of improving the "gross warning of impending attack" and enhancing the target folders of the Strategic Air Command.<sup>2</sup> Later, beginning in the 1970s, overhead reconnaissance would serve further the purposes of verifying certain aspects of arms-control treaties and providing "real-time" indications and warning.

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 The impetus that Sputnik transferred to American space affairs proved most fortuitous, for the Soviet Union, using a new ground-to-air missile, shot down a CIA U-2

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reconnaissance aircraft operating at design altitude (above [redacted] on 1 May 1960 deep in the Soviet heartland. That event scuttled plans for a Summit Conference among Soviet and Western leaders scheduled later in May, and consigned future aerial reconnaissance missions once more to flights about the periphery of the USSR. It also precipitated a thorough reappraisal of the Air Force reconnaissance satellite program at the highest levels of the government.<sup>3</sup>

Directing and Managing Overhead Reconnaissance

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[redacted] Much as General H. H. Arnold had perceived years before, the reconnaissance photographs and other data furnished by the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union divided logically between development/technical (threat and warning) intelligence, on the one hand, and operational (targeting and countermeasures) intelligence, on the other. In the most important first category, they had revealed "only a moderate test effort and, to the end of the flights, no deployment of operational ICBMs."<sup>4</sup> In Paris in mid-May 1960, Soviet Communist Party Chairman Nikita Khrushchev loudly condemned the U-2 overflights as an aggressive act in violation of international law. But before the Summit Conference dissolved, the Soviet leader advised French President Charles de Gaulle that the USSR did not object to earth satellites carrying photographic cameras in outer space. That remark,

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President Eisenhower's new Special Assistant for Science and Technology George B. Kistiakowsky recalled, eventually "became the foundation of a consistent policy (on reconnaissance satellites) of both superpowers."<sup>5</sup>

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having cancelled any further aerial reconnaissance overflights of the USSR, President Eisenhower on 26 May 1960 asked that an ad hoc group be formed to assess the nation's defense intelligence requirements, the ability of the Air Force Samos reconnaissance satellites to meet them, and the Defense Department plans for employing the system. To conduct that assessment, science advisor Kistiakowsky formed a small panel that included Polaroid's Edwin H. Land, a member of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PASC), Joseph V. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Carl Overhage of Lincoln Laboratory. In the wake of the U-2 incident, Eisenhower wanted the panel's conclusions and recommendations presented to the National Security Council as soon as possible.<sup>6</sup> In the weeks that followed, Charyk, Land, Kistiakowsky, and Kistiakowsky's associates in PSAC, performed the bulk of the review and staff work. The importance of their efforts was underscored on 19 August 1960 when the Air Force recovered the first film capsule ejected from an

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earth-orbiting CORONA satellite.\* Based on this recovery, and in spite of the loss of the U-2 four months before, it now appeared that the United States could continue to monitor selected activity in the Soviet Union, this time from outer space.<sup>7</sup>

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[ ] The original Air Force reconnaissance satellite effort at Lockheed, known as the Samos program in the summer of 1960, consisted of some six or seven different payloads in various stages of planning and development. Unlike CORONA, Samos had never been highly classified and its planning and contracting was widely reported in the press, which became a source of acute embarrassment after the U-2 episode in May. The Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) of the Air Research and Development Command contracted for and directed procurement of the upper stage booster-satellite at Lockheed and the payloads at other contractors such as Eastman Kodak and Itek. BMD also launched the satellite vehicles from missile ranges on the east and west coasts, and commanded them on orbit. Air Force plans called ultimately for the Strategic Air Command to

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[ ] Project personnel, led by Colonel Lee Battle at the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in Los Angeles, and [ ] at Lockheed Sunnyvale, had identified and fixed the cause of numerous reentry capsule failures just a few weeks earlier. Many of the techniques used in the aerial recovery of this satellite capsule near Hawaii, it is worth noting, were conceived by [ ] at [ ] and developed in the early 1950s to recover the balloon capsules in the WS-119L program.

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direct the operational system from Omaha, with the product furnished to government users. But this arrangement, in the opinion of a majority on the satellite reconnaissance review panel, did not best serve the interest of the country.<sup>8</sup>

25X1 NRO

☐ The intelligence to be acquired by Samos reconnaissance satellites, like that acquired by U-2 aircraft, panel members agreed, was a national asset that should not be entrusted to any single military service. Indeed, as an intelligence user, and besides information on air defenses, the Strategic Air Command needed only operational targeting information. This consideration, the need for clandestine operations to avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union on this issue, and Air Force management practices that had yet to produce positive results with the Samos read-out system, caused panel members to recommend that executive responsibility for and direction of the Samos reconnaissance satellite program be vested firmly at the highest civilian levels of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and that the Air Force, acting through a streamlined organization directly under the Air Force Secretary, manage it for the national intelligence directors. Moreover, to speed development of an operational system, panel members urged that first priority go to film-recovery efforts such as CORONA, with a lower priority accorded the Samos program. These conclusions and recommendations, with assent from Secretary of the Air Force

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Dudley C. Sharp making them unanimous, were presented to the President and the National Security Council on the morning of 25 August 1960.<sup>9</sup>

25X1NRO

[ ] To prevent a surprise attack and ensure the security of the United States, President Eisenhower had to know at any given moment the military posture of the Soviet Union. A few days earlier he had publicly announced increased funding of the Samos reconnaissance satellite program.<sup>10</sup> Now, he listened attentively to the presentation and approved all of the recommendations made by the satellite reconnaissance panel. The reorganized and clandestine program would be directed for him by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of ~~the CIA~~ <sup>Central Intelligence</sup> through the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The development and operation of CORONA and Samos satellites would be paid for by the Defense Department and managed by the CIA and Air Force, with a line of command running directly from the Secretary of Defense to the Air Force officer in charge on the West Coast.<sup>11</sup> In this arrangement, the Air Force retained control of the Samos series of reconnaissance vehicles, while the CIA remained in charge of the CORONA and ARGON payloads--the Itek and Kodak cameras and the GE return vehicle. Besides clearly identifying those civilians responsible for directing the consolidated effort and streamlining its military management, the NSC accorded reconnaissance satellites the

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highest of national priorities. No longer a back-up to the U-2, they would become the linchpin of the nation's strategic intelligence effort. In his diary that evening, George Kistiakowsky mused: "If the Defense Department sticks by its agreement with our recommendation of Samos . . . this may be a major accomplishment of my eighteen months in office."<sup>12</sup>

25X1 [ ] The Defense Department and the other institutional participants that acted on a NSC directive issued shortly thereafter did adhere to the Samos agreement. The special offices rapidly appeared, one in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and a second on the west coast near the Ballistic Missile Division (later Space Systems Division),

25X1 [ ] On 31 August 1960, Air Force Secretary Sharp established within the Pentagon the Air Force Office of Missiles and Satellite Systems (in September 1961 redesignated Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Space Systems [SAFSS] and, still later in May 1962, its covert cover, the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]). This office would control and fund the reconnaissance satellite program under the direction of Air Force Under Secretary Charyk and a CIA-CORONA representative, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., both of whom reported to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. (But Bissell, for reasons of his own, chose not to actively participate in SAFSS affairs until June 1961.)<sup>13</sup> Sharp appointed Major General Robert E. Greer director of the new

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Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects (SAFSP) to technically manage the operation from the west coast.<sup>14</sup> Greer, with two stars, reported directly to Charyk and could task the Ballistic Missile Division as needed. (The Ballistic Missile Division in 1961 bifurcated into the Ballistic Missile Division and Space Systems Division; SSD

[REDACTED] These actions entirely removed Air Force Systems Command (formerly Air Research and Development Command) from any directive role in the covert program.

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25X1 ( [REDACTED] As titular head of the nation's satellite reconnaissance programs, Air Force Under Secretary Charyk reported directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and possessed in these matters greater power than the Air Force Secretary or Chief of Staff. Only a few members of the Air Staff, the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, knew that the SAFSS was a cover for Charyk's secret space reconnaissance position. Except for these men, those in Space Systems Division who worked with General Greer, and those who received air defense and targeting intelligence, these organizational actions excluded Headquarters USAF and virtually all field commands from any participation in or knowledge of this activity.<sup>15</sup> Indeed,

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[ ]

with the President's approval, the reconnaissance satellite program itself disappeared entirely from "open" governmental discussion, if not entirely from public view.

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[ ] The reconnaissance satellite management arrangement that the President approved on 25 August 1960 was amended a year later, on 6 September 1961. In an agreement with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Lt General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric established the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) consisting "of all satellite and aerial overflight reconnaissance projects" operated by U.S. agencies, specifically, those programs controlled by the Under Secretary of the Air Force (designated Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense) and the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under terms of this agreement, the NRO, still known publicly as the SAFSS, funded the NRP and operated under the streamlined management arrangements already established. The Air Force, through the SAFSP on the West Coast, acquired and launched the NRP spacecraft for the NRO.<sup>16</sup>

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~~Following Bissell's resignation in February 1962, the~~  
[ ] To avoid unwanted tension between the principal organizations after Bissell's departure, four additional agreements were signed. The first of these on 5 December 1961 formally divided NRO responsibilities between the Air Force and the CIA. The second, dated 2 May 1962, identified three


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[REDACTED]

of the intelligence products. A separate entity, the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS), was established to task the SIGINT collectors. The USIB itself was renamed the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) in 1975 and, with its various committees such as SORS and COMIREX, has continued to the present day.<sup>19</sup>

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The institutions that set intelligence requirements and priorities might have evolved in a reasonably straightforward fashion, but NRO's relationship with the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community changed markedly between 1961 and 1986. The change began on 26 January 1973 when President Nixon abolished the position of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, thereby removing a key member of the ExCom--along with a representative from the Bureau of the Budget, James R. Schlesinger, who had previously accompanied the science advisor to ExCom meetings. A short time later President Nixon appointed the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, <sup>his</sup> successor, <sup>James Schlesinger,</sup> and subsequently William Colby, as Chairman of the NRO ExCom in place of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Thereafter, Deputy Defense Secretary Kenneth Rush, who outranked the DCI, also ceased attending the DCI-chaired ExCom meetings and sent Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, <sup>bert</sup> Alan C. Hall, in his place. The DCI chairman thus found himself without an ExCom link to the White House and unable to command the rapid

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response from Defense Department organizations that his predecessor could demand. Securing additional funding for NRP project requirements became an increasing problem and the time needed to implement ExCom decisions began to grow.<sup>20</sup>

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[ ] A second major change occurred almost two years later, in February 1976, when DCI Colby, with President Gerald Ford's approval, abolished the ExCom and replaced it with the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI). Chaired by Colby, the CFI was comprised of two other principal members: the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. But where the ExCom previously focused exclusively on the affairs of the NRP and its NRO, the CFI was chartered to control budget preparation and resource allocation for the entire National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).<sup>\*</sup> The magnitude of this enterprise was such that no three individuals could easily manage and direct it. The DCI therefore began to use the staff of his Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community, later known as the IC Staff (which had grown up around the USIB/NFIB), to manage CFI operations. In 1977, DCI Stansfield Turner created three more deputy directors: a Deputy Director (DD/DCI) for Resource Management [ ]

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
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[ ] The NFIP consists of the NRP and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the CIA Program (CIAP), and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).


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 a DD/DCI for Collection and Tasking (General Frank Camm), and a DD/DCI for National Foreign Assessment (Robert Bowie). Thereafter the IC Staff expanded to support these three offices while it played an ever-increasing role in NRP planning and budget activities. The time required to secure decisions and take action on overhead reconnaissance projects increased accordingly. Finally, in the reorganization of the Intelligence Community ordered by President Jimmy Carter in 1978, DCI Turner abolished the Committee on Foreign Intelligence altogether, consolidated the National Foreign Intelligence Program in his office with "full and exclusive authority" over its budget, and used the IC Staff for its management.<sup>21</sup>

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 The cumulative effect of these organizational changes on overhead reconnaissance was profound. By 1986 they had brought the NRO almost full circle, back near the point from whence it began 25 years earlier. The Director of the NRO and his CIA deputy in 1986 reported to the DCI and the IC Staff instead of the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the ExCom. Except for the biannual NRP funds "washed" through the Defense Department, the Secretary of Defense was no longer directly involved with the NRO. The simplified chain of command that President Eisenhower approved in 1960 had grown much more complex and diffuse. The principle of "collegiality" that the ExCom represented in the NRP had




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disappeared. In the 1980s the individual NRP project organizations began on occasion to deal directly with the IC Staff, which now controlled the funds, bypassing the NRO and its staff. Though its 1965 management charter remained basically unaltered, in terms of actually financing and implementing overhead reconnaissance, the NRO had in fact become another one among many bureaucratic levels within the intelligence community. But however much the NRP management structure might have changed, satellite reconnaissance planning and flight operations continued to function within the national space policy framework forged by President Eisenhower and refined by his successors.

#### Fine-Tuning U.S. Space Policy

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 Throughout his second term in office, President Eisenhower held firmly to the view that overhead reconnaissance from space was not militarily provocative like that of placing offensive weapons in orbit. It was thus clearly acceptable within his dictum of "peaceful," nonaggressive U.S. spaceflight operations, did not require prior consent of the nations over which these satellites might pass, and did not jeopardize the concept of "freedom of space." But despite Khrushchev's private remarks in Paris in 1960, Soviet leaders continued publicly to label reconnaissance from space an illegal, warlike act (until they began to launch reconnaissance satellites of their own, when

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
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9. Kistiakowsky, p. 384; Welzenbach, Chapter 7; Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume V, pp. 15-19. At the same time, Eisenhower also authorized a separate evaluation of U.S. intelligence agencies directed by CIA Inspector General Lyman D. Kirkpatrick. The Kirkpatrick report, submitted on 15 December 1960, further "cautioned about military domination of the intelligence process," and it resulted in a number of organizational changes approved by the President on 18 January 1961. See Prados, pp. 122-124.
10. "Text of President Eisenhower's Message to Congress," The Washington Post, 9 August 1960, p. A10; see also, Eisenhower p. 551.
11. Robert L. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Vol IIA, 1973, pp. 83-86; Kistiakowsky, pp. 378-379, 387-388; and "USAF Strengthens Samos Effort," Aviation Week, 12 September 1960, p. 31.
12. Kistiakowsky, p. 388.
13. Welzenbach, Chapter 7.
14. SAF Order 115.1 (U), 31 August 1960; SAF Order 116.1 (U), 31 August 1960; Memo (U), Dudley C. Sharp, Secretary of the Air Force, to General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, no subject, 31 August 1960, in OSAF 37-60, Vol 2; Kistiakowsky, p. 395.
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17. "Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program." , signed by Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and W. F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence, 11 August 1965.
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
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29. Unclassified discussion can be found in Amron H. Katz, "Observation Satellites: Problems and Prospects, Part 6," Astronautics, October 1960, pp. 37, 66-69; Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance and Arms Control," Scientific American, February 1973, p. 17; John M. Harding, "Vehicles and Sensors," in F. J. Ossenbeck and P. C. Kroeck, eds., Open Space and Peace: A Symposium on Effects of Observation (Stanford, Calif: The Hoover Institution, Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 59-62.

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